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Abstract
Blockholders’ incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems
and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed
trading of target firms’ stock when stocks are liquid. We show that stock liquidity increases the
probability of activism but does less so for potentially overvalued firms for which privately informed
blockholders may have greater incentives to sell their stake than to intervene. We also document
that activists accumulate more stocks in targets when stock is more liquid. We conclude that
liquidity helps overcome the free-rider problem and induces activism via preactivism accumulation
of target firms’ shares. (JEL G14, G34)
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Through their voting rights, shareholders have the formal power to affect the governance of public
companies. But shareholder activism is a rare event, a fact often attributed to its considerable
costs.1 Election contests demonstrate how costs can be substantial. A shareholder seeking to replace
existing board members in a proxy contest must run a public campaign, hire legal expertise, and
pay for producing and distributing his own slate of directors to the company’s other shareholders.2
Even if the overall value added exceeds the costs, a large shareholder’s incentives to monitor and
intervene are hampered by free-riding minority shareholders who reap the benefit of increased value,
but do not bear any of the costs.
Theory suggests that liquidity may help to overcome the free-rider problem and strengthen
the incentive of large shareholders to engage in costly activism (voice). If a firm’s stock is liquid
enough, a shareholder planning an intervention can profit from informed trading and recoup the cost
of activism by purchasing shares at a price that does not yet reflect the future increase in company
value created by his privately known actions (Maug 1998; Kahn and Winton 1998; Winton and Li
2006).3 In contrast, Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993) view liquidity as an impediment to intervention
because it allows blockholders to sell their shares without incurring large trading costs. Liquidity,
in this case, makes exit more attractive than voice.
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether liquidity induces shareholder activism in the
form of voice through informed trading as proposed by Maug (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998),
and Winton and Li (2006). For brevity, henceforth we will refer to this hypothesis as “voice”
or “the voice mechanism.” The mechanism of voice rests on the assumption that voice is costly.
We therefore hand-collect data on contested proxy solicitations in connection with shareholder
meetings. These are activist events that involve considerable costs as documented by Gantchev
(2013).
Our analysis is based on a sample of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ. Activist events are collected from the
1See, e.g., the evidence provided by Gillan and Starks (1998), Karpoff (2001), and Bebchuck (2007).
2The biggest European pension funds have been lobbying for proxy access in U.S. companies and have pointed to
the high costs of nominating individuals for election to the board as a factor behind their growing focus on non-U.S.
stocks; cf. “Plea for democracy in corporations,” The Financial Times, January 22, 2007.
3Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) propose that liquidity may mitigate the blockholder’s free-rider problem and
provide incentives for voice through improved price informativeness.
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Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). We record information from all filings made by nonmanagement and
filings relating to contested proxy solicitations during the years 1994 through 2007. We identify
385 shareholder activist events, for which the majority (87%) are filings concerning proxy contests,
and the rest are related to shareholder proposals or other types of disputes.
We start by documenting that at the time their intervention becomes publicly known, activists
own sizeable blocks of equity in the target firms, on average 9%. Activist shareholders therefore
tend to be blockholders, and the free-rider problem is likely to be relevant in our sample, leaving a
role for liquidity. Our paper contributes by providing four pieces of evidence on the role of liquidity
that all are consistent with the mechanism in the theories of Maug (1998), Kahn and Winton
(1998), and Winton and Li (2006).
First, we investigate the effect of liquidity on the likelihood of shareholder activism. We run
probit regressions and find a statistically and economically significant positive effect of stock liquid-
ity on the probability of activism. The results imply that a discrete increase in liquidity from the
10th to the 90th percentile more than doubles the likelihood of activism. Importantly, the positive
effect of liquidity that we estimate is purely driven by cross-sectional differences in liquidity because
we carefully control for its time variation in our regression specifications. In addition, we show that
our results are robust to various ways of handling the potential endogeneity of liquidity, including
instrumental variable regressions.
Second, Kahn and Winton (1998) and Winton and Li (2006) point out that private information
sometimes gives incentives for exit rather than voice: when a blockholder privately observes a
managerial problem and the stock is overvalued, his profit may be higher if he sells his stake
rather than intervenes to improve firm value. The higher liquidity, the stronger is the incentive
for blockholders to unwind their positions. To test this hypothesis, we interact liquidity with a
proxy for overvaluation. For firms with a high probability of being overvalued, high liquidity will
be associated with a higher prevalence of exit than for the average firm, and the effect of liquidity
on activism should be diminished. Our estimates show that the effect on activism of a discrete
increase in liquidity from the 10th to the 90th percentile is around 50% lower for the decile of firms
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most likely to be overvalued, compared with the decile of firms least likely to be overvalued.
Third, we directly examine shareholder activists’ pre-event trading of target firms’ stocks. We
hand-collect transactions data from activists’ 13D filings made with the SEC and record transactions
up to one year prior to the announcement date of activism. Our evidence shows that activists trade
extensively prior to activism: 76% of activists trade, and almost all trades (95%) are purchases. On
average, activists that trade accumulate 54% of their stock holdings during the 12-month period
prior to the announcement day. The trading profits earned are substantial; on average, activists
earn a return of 8.5% on the capital invested.
Finally, we document a link between the liquidity of a stock and the extent of activists’ trading.
Because the ability to trade without affecting the price is the source of the activists’ trading profits,
the voice mechanism implies that activists will accumulate more shares when target firm’s stock
is more liquid. This is exactly what we find. Regressing the fraction of the target firm’s shares
acquired by activists on liquidity and control variables, we show that liquidity has a direct positive
effect on the pre-event accumulation of target stocks.
Overall, our results suggest that informed trading is a substantive driver behind the positive
effect of liquidity on activism. The ability to trade in target firms’ stocks appears to be an integral
part of many shareholders’ intervention strategies, and our results highlight the importance of being
able to recoup the costs of activism in order for intervention to be worthwhile. The SEC has not
succeeded in its recent attempts to provide shareholders with easier access to proxy solicitations
of their alternative plans for a company, such as nominating directors.4 This suggests that stock
liquidity will continue to be a determining factor of activism and that shareholders of less liquid
firms may be hesitant to intervene in governance because of their inability to reclaim their outlays.
1. Relation to Existing Literature
Liquidity may affect corporate governance through several channels. The theories discussed in the
previous section focus on how liquidity and informed trading affect blockholders’ incentives for
4The SEC proposal of a new rule, Rule 14a-11, allowing shareholders to use company management proxy statement
to nominate directors and solicit votes for their election (under certain conditions), was vacated by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for DC in July 2011.
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voice. A recent group of theories have pointed to the threat of exit as an alternative mechanism
through which liquidity may affect governance (Edmans 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer 2009; Ed-
mans and Manso 2011). When managerial compensation is tied to the stock price, the threat that
informed blockholders may sell their shares and exit improves managerial incentives. Because the
threat is more credible when the cost of selling shares is lower, liquidity enhances the credibility of
exit threat. Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) and Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) study this
governance channel empirically and find evidence that threat of exit is a potent governance mecha-
nism. Although these studies focus on threat of exit—whereas we study the voice mechanism—they
encompass tests of voice as an alternative to exit, and we discuss the relation between these papers
and ours in what follows.
Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) (EFZ) identify investors’ preferences for voice versus threat
of exit from their filings of 13D and 13G forms with the SEC. The filing of one of these forms
is compulsory for shareholders crossing the 5% ownership threshold. Blockholders who intend to
influence the control of the firm must file a 13D, whereas blockholders without such intent may
file the less comprehensive 13G form. They argue that because 13G filers relinquish the option to
exercise voice, the threat of exit channel may be identified by studying how liquidity affects the
choice between 13G and 13D filings. Using a sample of activist hedge funds that have filed either
a 13D or a 13G form, EFZ find that higher liquidity is negatively associated with the probability
of filing the 13D form. They conclude: “Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the
likelihood that the blockholder governs through voice (...).” The apparent contradiction of this
result with our findings is due to differences in empirical design.
EFZ’s empirical specification assumes that blocks are accumulated with the intention of affecting
governance and that blockholders choose between the strategies of voice and threat of exit. If the
two strategies are substitutes, their result indeed implies that higher liquidity decreases activists’
preferences for voice. But if the strategies are not substitutes, investors’ selection of one does not
imply rejection of the other. Because their specification examines liquidity’s effect on the filing of
one form as opposed to the other, their result says that liquidity increases the relative attractiveness
of acquiring a 5% block without the option of voice (13G), compared with acquiring a 5% block
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with the voice option (13D), and therefore does not necessarily contrast with ours. For example,
if some governance problems can best be handled by voice and others by threat of exit, the EFZ
finding simply implies that liquidity has a relatively stronger effect on exit threat, but the effect of
liquidity on voice could still be positive.5 Alternatively, if investors accumulate blocks for reasons
unrelated to governance and trade on, for example, their perception of undervaluation, the EFZ
result implies that liquidity has a relatively stronger effect on investment in undervalued firms than
it has on the likelihood of voice.
The empirical specification in our paper tests how liquidity affects the choice between voice and
no governance using a sample of investors identified by their observed election of voice. To the extent
that 13D filings signify activist intent, our approach and results are consistent with a second result
provided by EFZ that shows that higher liquidity increases the (unconditional) probability that
hedge funds file a 13D against the alternative of not filing. However, Gantchev (2013) documents
that two-thirds of 13D-filing blockholders never go on to make any formal demands to their target.
Thus, the filing of a 13D form does not imply that the filer has paid or will pay the costs of an
actual intervention. A 13D filing is therefore a less suitable definition of an activist event for our
purposes because the mechanism that we test in this paper necessitates a high cost of activism.
Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) (BJN) take a different approach to test the threat of
exit theory, focusing on the relation between firm value and liquidity without reliance on actual
events of activism. They document that exogenous liquidity shocks have a larger effect on the value
of firms with blockholders. Recognizing that this is consistent, both with threat of exit and the
mechanism of voice, they show that the accentuating effect of blockholders is stronger in firms in
which managerial compensation is more sensitive to firm value. The identification strategy of BJN
validates threat of exit by showing that liquidity’s impact is stronger in subsamples in which threat
of exit would be expected to be present. This, however, does not rule out that voice is operative
in other subsamples. It also does not imply that investors prefer one governance strategy over the
other. Indeed, BJN conclude that threat of exit and voice are distinct and concomitant governance
mechanisms. This is also consistent with survey evidence presented by McCahery, Sautner, and
5Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) demonstrate that some types of agency problems cannot be remedied through
threat of exit, suggesting that investors would prefer voice for certain governance problems.
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Starks (2011), showing that dissatisfied institutional investors frequently make use of both exit and
voice. Compared with BJN, our paper contributes by distinctly focusing on the effect of liquidity
on voice and by studying actual events of activism.
Our paper is also related to a large empirical literature on the effects of shareholder activism.
Early papers on activism, surveyed by Gillan and Starks (1998) and Karpoff (2001), provide little
evidence that activism by institutional investors is able to impact the performance of targeted
firms. A more recent group of papers collect data on hedge fund activism from 13D filings to
identify hedge funds’ targeting strategies and assess the value created by their activism (Brav et al.
2008; Clifford 2008; Greenwood and Schor 2009; Klein and Zur 2009; Brav, Jiang, and Kim 2010).
One insight from these studies is that hedge funds successfully target undervalued companies with
stable cash flows and bring about improvements in target firms’ performance. Although Brav et
al. (2008) report that hedge funds tend to target more liquid firms, they do not consider how
liquidity impacts their incentive to undertake activism. Becht et al. (2009) also show that hedge
fund activism may increase firm value, using detailed data on activist engagements by the Hermes
U.K. Focus Fund. Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2013) study how 13D-filing hedge funds are able to
quickly accumulate concentrated stakes in target firms. They find that activist hedge funds acquire
target firms’ stock in response to price pressure generated by institutional investors that are selling
the stock in response to outflow shocks. An early contribution by Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009)
documents a positive effect of liquidity on company performance but focuses on mechanisms other
than voice. Rather than focusing on the effectiveness of activism and its effect on firm valuation,
we investigate the impact of stock liquidity on shareholders’ incentives to take an active role in the
first place.
2. Data and Sample Selection
We use a sample of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ. Data on shareholder activism and preactivism trading are
collected from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) of the
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Stock returns, prices, and data on volume traded are
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Data on effective trading costs (Hasbrouck
2009) are from Joel Hasbrouck’s Web site. Accounting variables are from Compustat. Data on
analyst following are from I/B/E/S. We use Thomson Financial Ownership data (CDA/Spectrum
s34) to collect information on institutional investors’ ownership. The following section describes
our data selection procedure and explains how we define and measure shareholder activism and
stock liquidity.
2.1 Shareholder activism
In the context of this paper, a firm is said to experience “shareholder activism” in year t if a
shareholder files material that contests the proxy solicitations of the firm’s management.
At shareholder meetings, registered shareholders vote using proxy cards. Issues to be voted
on are decided by management and the board of directors and are included in a company’s proxy
material mailed to its shareholders. Proxy contests are situations in which a group of shareholders
disagree with the policies proposed by management and the dissident shareholders solicit proxies
from other shareholders by filing their own proxy material with the SEC. Shareholders return
the proxy cards of the company or the dissident shareholders depending on which campaign they
support. Dissidents’ distribution of alternative proxy material to shareholders is time consuming,
costly, and typically requires legal advice. Proxy solicitations by dissident shareholders commonly
include an alternative slate of nominee candidates to the board but may also include proposals
to sell the company, approve or vote against a merger, increase the size of the board, or replace
management.
Alternatively, shareholders may include “shareholder proposals” directly in the company’s proxy
material, permitting a vote on the proposal at the shareholder meeting. This right is provided by
Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but company’s management may refuse to in-
clude proposals that nominate candidates to the board of directors or directly conflict with policies
proposed by management. Shareholder proposals are almost always only advisory to the board ac-
cording to state laws. Recent changes in Rule 14-a8 made by the SEC have empowered shareholders
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to implement proxy access by specifying procedures by which shareholders may nominate directors.
These rules came into effect from 2012 and therefore did not apply to the events of activism in our
sample. In our sample, proxy contests are the only means of nominating alternative directors.
As of May 6, 1996, all public domestic companies in the United States are required to file
material corporate information on EDGAR. We use EDGAR to identify firms that experience
shareholder activism and manually retrieve forms filed in connection with shareholder meetings
by nonmanagement and filings relating to contested proxy solicitations. Specifically, we define an
activist as a shareholder filing one or more of the following SEC forms: forms PREC14A, PREN14A,
PRRN14A, DEFC14A, DEFN14A, DFRN14A, DFAN14A, and DEFC14C up to the third quarter of
2007. We do not collect separate information about shareholder proposals from other sources than
these forms. Sponsors of shareholder proposals sometimes file materials or statements under Rule
14a-12.6 Also, proxy statements sometimes mention that the sponsor of a contested solicitation is
also behind one or several shareholder proposals. Some of our activist events, therefore, will consist
of shareholder proposals, either alone or in combination with proxy contests.
Some investors filed voluntarily on EDGAR between the third quarter of 1993 and May 1996
and are included in our sample to the extent that these voluntary filings represent contested proxy
material. For the sample period starting with the third quarter of 1993 through the third quarter
of 2007, we identify 8,783 unique forms filed by nonmanagement. It is common for a filer to file a
sequence of forms concerning the same issue for the same firm, especially in relation to contested
solicitations in which both management and nonmanagement typically file interchangeably with
the SEC a number of times. We adopt the rule that the first date of a filing sequence defines the
year in which the firm in question experiences shareholder activism. If there is a period of more
than one year of no filings in a sequence of filings, the first filing after the gap is defined as the
first filing in a new intervention. A gap of more than one year in a sequence of filings occurs in 20
cases, representing about 2% of our filing sequences.
Following these procedures, we are able to collect 998 such shareholder activism firm-year
6Rule 14a-12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act permits a party that is required to file a proxy statement to
commence a proxy solicitation before the time of filing the proxy statement with the SEC. The rule enables dissident
shareholders to communicate their position to other shareholders.
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observations from the years 1994 up to and including the third quarter of 2007 (the sample, thus,
is not confounded by the events of the Lehman default and the following financial crisis). The
sample is reduced by 174 observations because we cannot find the event firm in CRSP and by an
additional 135 observations because we require the event firm to be listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ with common equity. In the analysis that follows, we require information from both
CRSP and Compustat. Restricting the sample firms to have information on market capitalization
and book-to-market ratio in the year prior to the activism year reduces the sample by another 98
observations. A closer inspection of the remaining observations reveals that 88 cases are filings
that follow a friendly negotiated merger agreement between the filer and the subject firm. These
observations are removed from the sample, leaving us with 503 cases of shareholder activism.
Finally, we eliminate filings in which the shareholder activist has made a formal tender offer or
a more informal expression of interest in the subject firm (“bear hug”). In these cases, the sponsor
of the solicitation intends to acquire all the shares in the target and is taking steps toward initiating
an election contest, for example, with the purpose of electing new directors willing to redeem bylaws
that impede a takeover. Proxy solicitations in acquisition-related cases are essentially a referendum
on the sponsor’s offer for the company (Bebchuck 2007). We identify 118 such events, leaving us
with 385 activist events.7
The data we collect differ from the recent studies of hedge fund activism by Brav et al. (2008),
Klein and Zur (2009), and Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013), as the activists in our sample are not
limited to hedge funds and our events are not collected from 13D filings. However, many of the
shareholder activists in our sample file a 13D form prior to engaging in a proxy fight with the
management. Some overlap with hedge fund data collected from 13D filings is therefore natural.
Our data are more similar to those of Greenwood and Schor (2009), who collect both 13D and
DFAN filings from a period similar to ours (1993–2006). Their focus, however, is on how hedge
fund activists create value, whereas we use all types of activists and study how liquidity influence
the decision to become a shareholder activist.
7Friendly negotiated mergers, tender offers, and “bear hugs” are kept in the sample as nonactivism events. Under
our null hypothesis, liquidity has no effect on activism, and it would, in principle, favor the alternative to remove
these cases. In practical terms, removing these cases from our analysis altogether has no effects on the results.
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Moreover, investors may acquire blocks of shares and file the 13D form for reasons unrelated
to the target firm’s governance. For example, many hedge funds pursue event-driven strategies
attempting to profit from the mispricing of companies around major events, such as mergers or
restructurings. Such strategies are known as risk or merger arbitrage. The SEC has established that
risk arbitrageurs who acquire target shares following announcement of a tender offer for the purpose
of tendering or exchanging the stocks in the merger are not eligible to file form 13G but must file
the 13D form.8 Thus, the identification of hedge fund activism by their 13D filings encompasses
actions that do not necessarily constitute the kind of activism envisioned in the theoretical models
discussed already.9 If voice-related filings constitute only a part of the 13D filings made by hedge
funds, the covariation of 13D-filings with liquidity will also reflect the reaction of these nonvoice
filings to changes in liquidity.10
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of shareholder activism over the years in our sample. Each bar in
the figure represents the fraction of firms that experience shareholder activism in a given year. The
fraction varies from 0.11% to 0.83%. This represents an average of about 28 shareholder activism
cases per year. The first two years in the sample show a number of activism cases that are below
average. This is most likely driven by the fact that fewer firms filed through EDGAR at the time
when filing was not required by the SEC. The occurrence of shareholder activism was relatively
stable during the ten-year period of 1996 through 2005. Assuming that the fourth quarter of 2007
(outside the sample period) displays the same activism intensity as the first three quarters of 2007,
activism activity in both 2006 and 2007 is noticeably higher than in the previous years of the
sample.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample of activism events. Panel A shows the type
of activism. The bulk of our events involve proxy contests (331+3). Shareholder proposals are a
8The reason being that the transaction changes the control of the issuer. Faith Colish, SEC No-Action Letter,
March 24, 1980.
9Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue that documented positive returns from hedge funds’ activism are driven by
their profits from takeover-related strategies. Hence, we should expect a nonnegligible fraction of hedge funds’ 13D
filings to relate to such investments, and we exclude from our sample all events related to (friendly or hostile) mergers.
10On the other hand, 13D filings may indirectly pick up informal intervention strategies such as private engagement
with management, while such actions will not be included in our data. The documentation by Becht et al. (2009)
indicates that private intervention may be important, but because little data on private intervention are available, it
is difficult to gauge the importance of liquidity for such types of activism.
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means of activism in 12% of our events (43+3). Proxy contests and proposals may both be used in
the same event, although this is not common and occurs in only three instances. The “Other”-type
of activism is, for example, a request by the filer asking other shareholders to write to the target
firm’s management to express dissatisfaction about a particular issue.
Panel B categorizes events according to activist identity and stock ownership. The categories
are overlapping. If, for example, a hedge fund and a pension fund file jointly, we register the identity
of the filer both as a pension fund and a hedge fund. Filings by two different activist types are
quite common. Appendix A explains the categories of activists’ types.
Hedge funds are involved in almost half of the filings in our sample. Shareholder committees
are the second most active type of activist and are involved in 29% of our sample events,11 whereas
individual investors are behind 13% of the events. The remaining activist types make up less
than 10% of our events. The low involvement of institutional investors may reflect that institu-
tional investors prefer to exert influence on management through more informal channels or that
institutional investors display a certain reluctance to get involved in activism.
For hedge funds, shareholder committees and individual investors, the average ownership stake
at the time of activism is between 9 and 11%. Thus, the average shareholder activist in our sample
is a relatively large blockholder. The industrial shareholder activists’ holdings are the largest at
more than 15% on average. Workers unions are at the other end of the scale, they own close to 0%
in target firms. The overall average holding for shareholder activists is about 9%.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the distribution of the stated purposes of activism. The far most
prevalent cause of activist campaigns is a conflict over directors. As many as 83% of our activist
shareholders propose alternative director nominees. Other common conflicts arise over corporate
governance policies and voting procedures (43%), the company’s business strategy (42%), initiatives
to sell off part of the firms (34%), and other measures to improve efficiency (26%).
11A shareholder committee is a coordinated group of shareholders joining forces in their attempt to influence the
target company’s governance. It can comprise both institutional and individual shareholders.
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2.2 Preactivism trading in target firms by shareholder activists
To investigate the voice hypothesis, we hand-collect data on how shareholder activists trade in target
firms prior to the activism announcement date. Rule 13D-1(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act
requires active investors to file with the SEC to disclose the acquisition of more than 5% of any
class of securities of a publicly traded company. The Schedule 13D filing includes trading dates,
prices, and quantities traded during the 60-day period before the filing date.
For each target firm, we search back in time for the 13D filing that is closest to the activism
announcement date. If the filing date of this 13D filing is no more than one year prior to the
announcement date, we record activists’ trades as reported in the 13D filing. In addition, we search
in subsequently filed amendments (SC 13D/A) to the original 13D filing as these amendments
often contain information about additional trades. Hence, if an activist’s 13D filing coincides with
the activism announcement date, we have information about his trades 60 days back in time. If
an activist’s most recent 13D-filing occurs 6 months prior to the announcement date, we have
information about his trades for a period of 8 months prior to the announcement date. Thus, when
considering the one-year period prior to the activism announcement, our procedure for collecting
trades will potentially ignore early trades if the activist files more than one 13D during the period.
The motivation for the selected procedure is to focus on the trades that are closest to the activism
announcement day.
Although we have 385 activist events in our sample as described in Table 1, we lose some events
in the regression analysis below because of missing observations associated with the regressions’
control variables. We therefore collect data on trades for a sample of 354 activist events, which
are the events included in our main empirical specification, to be presented in Table 3, Column
2. For this core sample, we are able to find trades by the shareholder activist in the target firm
in 197 cases. There are 157 cases for which we have no information about trading. In 88 of the
no-trade cases, the activist owned less than 5% of the target firm’s shares at the announcement and
was therefore not required to report his trades. In these instances we do not know if the activist
actually did not trade or just did not report the trades. There are another seven cases for which
we do not know the ownership of the activist at the time of the announcement. Removing the
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95 cases with unknown ownership or ownership less than 5% leaves us with a sample of 259 event
firms for which we have information about trading—197 with trades and 62 with no trades. For
the 197 event firms with trades, we have registered 11,518 trades during the period that starts on
day −252 relative to the activism announcement and ends on day +40.
Figure 2 shows the average net fraction of outstanding shares traded by activists on event days
−252 through +40 relative to the announcement day. This figure shows that shareholder activists
purchase a significant fraction of the target firm’s stock prior to the announcement. Notice that
almost all trades of the target firm’s stock are purchases. We will return to more descriptive
statistics on activists’ trading in Section 3.4.
3. Empirical Evidence
3.1 The probability of shareholder activism
In our basic specification we examine the relation between shareholder activism and liquidity using
the following probit model:
Prob (ACTit = 1 | Lit−s,Xit−1) = Φ
(
γt + γ1Lit−s + γ′2Xit−1
)
. (1)
The dependent variable, ACTit, equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and is
zero otherwise, Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function, and Lit is a continuous measure
of firm i’s stock liquidity defined such that Lit is increasing in liquidity. Our main measure of
liquidity is the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009) multiplied by −1. The parameter
γt denotes year fixed effects, and Xit is a (k× 1) vector of control variables to be explained in what
follows.
Control variables are measured in the year prior to the year of activism, whereas liquidity is
lagged s additional years. This is to guard against a potential endogeneity problem caused by
unobservable omitted variables correlated with both liquidity and activism. If the vector of control
variables omits such variables, the estimated coefficient on liquidity will be biased.
15
For example, more liquid firms are likely to have more diffuse ownership structures with smaller
shareholders. Small shareholders may have few other means of intervention than proxy solicita-
tions. Conversely, less liquid firms with more concentrated ownership structure may have large
shareholders that can influence management through both formal and informal channels. If we
do not control for ownership dispersion, the correlation between stock liquidity and the incidence
of proxy solicitations could be spurious—driven by ownership structure rather than liquidity. We
include three variables that control for ownership structure: “Herfindahl index of institutional own-
ership,” measured as the sum of squared ownership fractions for shareholders making 13F filings
with the SEC, “Institutional holding,” measured as the aggregate stockholdings of shareholders
making 13F filings to the SEC, and “Institutional breadth,” measured as the number of institu-
tional investors that have reported ownership through 13F filings normalized with the total number
of institutional owners reporting in a given year (Chen, Hong, and Stein 2002).
Similarly, momentum may be correlated both with the incidence of activism and with liquidity.
Momentum losers may have higher liquidity, and subsequent poor returns may foster activism
in future periods, causing the estimated effect of liquidity to be biased for stocks with negative
momentum. To prevent momentum from biasing our results, we include “Abnormal performance,”
lagged one and two periods. “Abnormal performance” is measured as the arithmetic average
monthly abnormal performance for firm i from January through December. Abnormal monthly
performance for firm i in month s is computed as follows: using a minimum of twelve monthly
returns and a maximum of sixty monthly returns for the period s − 60 through s − 1, we regress
excess returns for stock i on the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a momentum factor.
If less than twelve monthly returns are available when estimating factor coefficients for firm i, the
returns on stock i are replaced by the returns on stock i’s industry portfolio. The industry portfolio
is one of the Fama-French 12 industry portfolios. The coefficients from this regression are multiplied
with the corresponding factor realizations for month s and summed to obtain the benchmark return
for month s. The abnormal return for month s is the difference between the return on stock i and the
benchmark return. All factors and industry portfolio returns were downloaded from Ken French’s
Web site.
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The visibility of a targeted firm may be correlated both with the incidence of activism and with
liquidity. Stocks that are followed by many analysts may be both more liquid and more subjected
to shareholder activism because of greater media coverage. To prevent visibility from biasing our
results, we include “Analyst coverage,” measured as the number of analysts that report earnings
estimates to I/B/E/S, as a control variable in the regressions.
In addition, we include a number of other control variables intended to pick up individual
firm characteristics: “Volatility” is the standard deviation of monthly returns during year t − 1.
“Nasdaq” is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the stock is listed on NASDAQ and
zero otherwise. “Log(Market cap)” is measured as the natural logarithm of the end-of-December
market capitalization. “Book-to-market ratio” is measured as the book value of equity divided by
the market value of equity at the end of the calendar year. “Log(Sales)” is measured as the natural
logarithm of the dollar value of sales. “Cash” is measured as cash and marketable securities divided
by total assets. “Dividend yield” is measured as the total dividend (common dividend plus preferred
dividend) divided by market value of common equity plus book value of preferred equity. Book
value of preferred equity is the first nonmissing value when using redemption value, liquidating
value, and the carrying value in that order. “R&D” is measured as research and development
expenses divided by total assets. If R&D expenses are missing from Compustat, they are assumed
to be zero. All variables constructed as ratios and using data from Compustat (book-to-market
ratio, Cash, dividend yield) are trimmed by removing the lower and upper 0.005 percentile. R&D
has a minimum value of zero and is trimmed only on the right tail.
Finally, our specification includes year fixed effects. Both shareholder activism and stock market
liquidity have risen during the last couple of decades. A regression of the incidence of activism on
liquidity may therefore show a positive effect of liquidity on activism, even if the trends in the two
variables occur for unrelated reasons. Our hypotheses, however, concern cross-sectional differences
between stocks. If the time trend is not controlled for, the estimated coefficient of liquidity may
pick up the time variation in liquidity, rather than the cross-sectional variation, in which we are
interested. This is akin to the omitted variable bias discussed already. The positive trends in
activism and stock market liquidity induce a comovement that may be alleviated if we include a
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control for time in the regression.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the right-hand side variables in model (1). The first
four numerical columns report the number of nonmissing firm-years and averages for firm-years
with activism and for firm-years without activism. As reported in Panel A of Table 1, there are a
total of 385 events in our sample. The second column shows that there are missing observations
for some of the control variables. Thus, when all variables are used in a regression, our sample will
generally include less than 385 event firms. The table presents initial evidence of a relation between
shareholder activism and liquidity. Firms that experience shareholder activism have significantly
higher liquidity than do firms that do not experience activism. Target firms also underperform the
Fama and French (1993) plus momentum benchmark on average, indicating that the occurrence of
shareholder activism is negatively related to the target firm’s stock market performance. Among
the remaining control variables, target firms have more institutional shareholders, lower volatility,
lower book-to-market ratio, and spend less on R&D.
Moving on to the probit regressions, Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of Equa-
tion (1). We present results for two different lags of liquidity. In Column (1), liquidity is measured
contemporaneously with the other covariates. This specification assumes that liquidity is an ex-
ogenous variable. It is possible, however, that changes in ownership in year t− 1 affect liquidity in
year t and that those ownership changes give rise to subsequent shareholder activism. Although we
include measures of ownership structure as control variables, they may not capture all patterns of
changes equally well and there may be an omitted variable problem. For this reason, our preferred
specification lags liquidity one additional year, to year (t−2). The results estimated using this lat-
ter specification are presented in Column (2) of the table. All regressions include year fixed effects
(not shown). The estimated coefficients for the year fixed effects are generally highly significant.
The probit regression in Column (1) shows a statistically significant and positive effect of liquid-
ity on the probability of activism. When measuring liquidity in year t− 2 relative to the activism
year (Column (2)), the effect of liquidity remains positive and statistically significant. Thus, firms
with more liquid stocks are more likely to be targeted by shareholder activists. The economic effect
corresponding to the estimated coefficients is also large. The bottom part of the table reports the
18
effect on the probability of activism for an increase in stock liquidity from the 10th to the 90th
percentile, holding other variables at their sample means. For the specification in Column (2),
such an increase in liquidity generates a statistically significant 0.40 percentage points increase in
the likelihood of activism.12 Despite the small absolute value of this change, there are at least
two reasons why this is an economically important finding. First, the unconditional probability of
activism in the sample is only 0.56%. Thus, the estimated increase from the 10th to 90th percentile
is 71.2% of the sample probability of activism. In other words, holding everything else constant,
the difference in liquidity when comparing the most liquid to the least liquid stocks accounts for
a difference in activism almost two-thirds as large as the overall chance of experiencing activism.
Second, shareholder activism in the form of voice is not always observable to outsiders. The events
used to identify shareholder activism in this paper are rare. This does not mean that voice is an
unimportant form of activism. Survey evidence by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011) shows
that more than 50% of institutional investors are willing to employ voice by engaging management
in discussions.
Turning to the coefficient estimates of the control variables in Column (2) of Table 3, we see
that the probability of activism is negatively related to past stock market performance; that is,
underperforming firms are more likely to be targets of activism.13 Both institutional ownership
and breath are positively related to shareholder activism. This is consistent with the findings of
Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2013), who show that institutional selling pressure arising from liquidity
shocks facilitates activist hedge funds’ acquisition of target firms’ stock.
In sum, the results presented in Table 3 show that liquidity, on average, has a positive effect on
the probability of activism. Thus, our findings support the notion that liquidity improves corporate
governance by facilitating shareholder activism. The next section investigates the robustness of this
conclusion.
12The likelihood increases from 0.33 to 0.73 percent points for the 10th and the 90th percentile respectively. A
Wald test of the null hypothesis that the change in the probability of activism is equal to zero has a p-value of 0.000
(standard errors are estimated with the delta method).
13Other papers also find that poor past market-adjusted stock performance increases the probability of activism.
See, for example, Gordon and Pound (1993), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins
(1999), who study shareholder proposals, and Faleye (2004), who study proxy contests.
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3.2 Robustness checks
Table 4 reports probit regressions as specified in Equation (1), but with alternative ways of mea-
suring liquidity. In Column (1), we lag liquidity even further, measuring it over the years t− 4 and
t − 3 relative to the year of activism. The results are qualitatively similar to our earlier results.
The effect of a discrete increase in liquidity from the bottom to the top decile continues to generate
a sizeable increase in the likelihood of activism.
Even though the probit regression includes carefully selected control variables, one may never-
theless worry that some unobservable firm-specific characteristic correlated with both liquidity and
activism is biasing our results. We therefore also present results from an instrumental variable pro-
bit regression. Valid instruments must be correlated with stock liquidity but uncorrelated with any
unobservable variables that may exert an independent effect on activism. We use two instruments
for liquidity. First, we construct an instrument that exploits the introduction of decimalization on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in 2001. The introduction of decimalization constitutes an exoge-
nous shock to liquidity that is uncorrelated with shareholder activism as required for an instrument.
To create cross-sectional variation in the instrument, we interact a dummy for decimalization with
the average firm size over the years prior to decimalization.14 We prefer to measure firm size by
Ln(sales) because sales are unaffected by movements in stock prices as opposed to, say, market
capitalization. The interacted variable equals zero prior to decimalization and attains a constant
value in the years afterwards, such that the constant magnitude is larger for larger firms. The sec-
ond instrument is created from the average liquidity of stocks in industries other than the industry
of the stock in question. We use average liquidity of firms in other industries in year t − 2 as an
instrument for the liquidity of stock i in year t − 2. The construction and further justification of
instruments are explained in detail in Appendix Appendix B.
Column (2) shows results from an instrumental variable probit regression using the two instru-
ments described already. The results are qualitatively unchanged compared to the previous results.
The effect of liquidity is statistically significant although somewhat larger and estimated with less
14Furfine (2003) and Chakravarty, Wood, and van Hess (2004) document that the impact of decimalization was
larger for stocks traded more actively, and we use size as a proxy for more actively traded stocks.
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precision as would be expected. The estimated effect of a discrete increase in liquidity from the 10th
to 90th percentile also appears to be somewhat large when compared with our other estimates, but
the estimate is statistically significant at a level below 5%. The corresponding first-stage regres-
sions, a Wald test of exogeneity, and an overidentification test of instrument validity are enclosed
as Table Appendix B.1 in Appendix Appendix B.
The remaining two columns show results from regressions using, respectively, a measure of liq-
uidity orthogonalized with respect to ownership, and a zero-one dummy representation of liquidity.
In Column (3), liquidity is measured using the residual from the regression:
Lt−2 = γ0 + γ1Herft−2 + γ2InstHt−2 + γ3InstBt−2 + γ4AvgLt−2 + t−2 ,
where L is the Hasbrouck (2009) measure multiplied by −1, Herf is the Herfindahl index of insti-
tutional ownership, InstH is Institutional holdings, InstB is Institutional breadth, and AvgL is the
average Hasbrouck (2009) illiquidity in the cross-section of firms in year t − 2. We bootstrap the
standard errors to make them robust to nonnormalities in the data. In Column (4), liquidity is
measured as a dummy variable that equals one in year t if the stock’s liquidity is greater than the
cross-sectional median in year t and zero otherwise.
In both specifications documented in the last columns of Table 4, the effect of liquidity is clearly
significant and economically large. The increase in the probability of activism when liquidity goes
from the bottom to the top decile is of similar size as in the model in Column (1) and continues to
be economically sizable.
In the next set of robustness checks, documented in Table 5, we replace Hasbrouck’s (2009)
effective cost measure with the trade impact measure of Amihud (2002). To ensure that higher
values of the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity, the Amihud trade impact measure
is also multiplied by −1. The measure is also winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. This
removes some big outliers, caused by stocks with very large stock returns and low volume, that are
close to 500 times larger than the average liquidity. Columns (1) through (4) in the table report
the results from estimating model (1) using four different measures of Amihud liquidity: liquidity
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measured one year prior to the year of activism, liquidity measured two years prior to the year of
activism, liquidity measured over years t−4 and t−3 relative to the year of activism, and liquidity
instrumented in the same way as described in connection with Column (2) of Table 4. The Amihud
measure produces qualitatively similar results to the Hasbrouck measure. The effect of liquidity is
positive and statistically significant. Looking at the bottom part of Table 5, where we estimate the
change in the probability of activism when liquidity is changed from the 10th to 90th percentile,
the estimated impact of liquidity on activism is smaller than the previously estimated effect. The
magnitude is, however, still economically significant, constituting an increase in the probability of
activism that is approximately 20% higher than the frequency of activism in the regression sample.
Overall, the results presented in this robustness section show that the findings in Table 3 are
robust to how liquidity is defined and to the period over which liquidity is measured. Thus, we
retain our conclusion that liquidity, on average, increases the probability of activism. Although, the
average effect of liquidity in our sample of event firms, could potentially conceal interesting cross-
sectional variations in the effect of liquidity. The next section investigates such cross-sectional
variations.
3.3 Activism in overvalued firms
Our results so far indicate that the average effect of liquidity on the probability of activism is
positive. However, the effect of liquidity may, for some firms, work in the opposite direction. As
pointed out by Kahn and Winton (1998) and Winton and Li (2006), a blockholder who privately
observes that a firm is overvalued may find it optimal to sell rather than initiate a value-improving,
but costly, intervention. Winton and Li (2006) show theoretically that the more liquid the stock,
the larger is the incentive to exit in this case. Conversely, when the stock is illiquid, the costs of
selling out may exceed the costs of intervention. This argument implies that for overvalued firms,
the effect of liquidity on the likelihood of activism is negative.
By nature, it is impossible to identify the firms in which blockholders have private information
about overvaluation. The theory can, however, be tested using empirical proxies for overvaluation.
We draw on different strands of the literature to construct such proxies. First, there is an extensive
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body of literature investigating the theories of Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps (1978) and
showing that stocks subject to short-sale constraints and differences of opinion can be overvalued in
equilibrium. We follow Nagel (2005) and measure short-sale constraints by institutional ownership.
Nagel (2005) argues that stocks with low institutional ownership tend to have sparse stock loan
supply. Consequently, short-sale constraints can be proxied by Ln(1/Institutional Holding), where
Institutional Holding is the fraction of outstanding shares held by institutions filing 13F forms with
the SEC. To proxy for differences in opinion about the valuation of a given stock, we follow Baker
and Wurgler (2007) and use return volatility. Return volatility is measured as the standard devia-
tion of monthly stock returns over a period of one year.15 We combine the two proxies for differences
of opinion and short-sale constraints in the measure Ln(Volatility/Institutional Holding). Holding
Volatility fixed, the likelihood of the stock being short sale constrained is increasing in this measure.
Fixing Institutional Holding, differences of opinion are also increasing in the measure. Thus, the
likelihood of overvaluation is increasing in Ln(Volatility/Institutional Holding). As robustness, we
also use Ln(1/Institutional Holding) and Volatility as separate measures of overvaluation.
Second, we adopt the idea that prolonged stock price pressure may result from institutional
trading because of the inflows and outflows they face from investors (Sias, Starks, and Titman
2006; Coval and Stafford 2007). A mutual fund experiencing large inflows would tend to increase
its existing positions, inducing positive price pressure in the stocks it already holds. Stocks with
high price pressure are more likely to be overvalued. We follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012) and create a measure of price pressure caused by mutual fund inflows. We get mutual
fund holdings from Thomson Reuters and mutual fund flows from CRSP and consider equity funds
only, omitting sector specific funds. The inflow-induced price pressure on stock i in quarter j is
constructed as
Price Pressureit =
M∑
j=1
Fjt × sijt−1
V OLit
, (2)
where Fjt is the dollar value of inflows experienced by mutual fund j in quarter t, sijt−1 is the
proportion of mutual fund j’s total assets accounted for by stock i at the end of the previous
15Berkman et al. (2009) also use institutional ownership to measure short-sale constraints and return volatility to
proxy for differences of opinion.
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quarter, and V OLit is the dollar trading volume of stock i in quarter t.
16 In (2), the summation
is only done for mutual funds for which Fjt scaled by total assets exceeds 5%. In the analysis
below, Price Pressureit is summed over the four quarters in a calendar year. Notice that the
price pressure variable is not computed from mutual funds’ actual purchases of stock i but instead
assumes that mutual funds experiencing inflows of significant size purchase additional stocks in
proportion to their existing holdings. This reduces that likelihood that the price pressure variable
is capturing mutual funds’ information-based trading.
The theories of Kahn and Winton (1998) and Winton and Li (2006) suggest that the effect
of liquidity on activism is negative for overvalued firms. In the data we do not, however, expect
to find a negative relation for two reasons: First, by their nature, our proxies for overvaluation
are noisy. Thus, some of the firms that we classify as overvalued may be correctly priced or even
undervalued. Second, our overvaluation measures do not incorporate the potential firm-specific
value improvements generated by activism. Thus, certain firms classified as overvalued by our
proxies, may be undervalued when the value improvement resulting from the activists’ actions are
also taken into account. For such firms, there should be a positive relation between liquidity and the
probability of activism. In line with this, rather than expecting to find a negative relation between
liquidity and the probability of activism, we hypothesize that the previously documented positive
effect of liquidity on activism is likely to be diminished for overvalued firms. In what follows, we
test this hypothesis.
We specify a probit regression that allows us to test if the effect of liquidity on the probability
of activism changes with overvaluation. Using price pressure to illustrate, we are interested in
examining whether the effect of liquidity on the probability of activism is different among firms
with low price pressure (less likely to be overvalued) and firms with high price pressure (more likely
to be overvalued). We investigate this by adding an interaction term to the probit model presented
16The proportion of mutual fund j’s total assets accounted for by stock i is given by
sijt =
Nijt × Pit
TAjt
,
where Nijt is the number of shares in stock i held by mutual fund j in quarter t, Pit is the market price of stock i at
the end of quarter t, and TAjt is total assets held by the fund in quarter t.
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in Equation (1):
Prob (ACTit = 1| . ) = Φ
(
γt + γ1Lit−2 + γ2Zit−1 + γ3Zit−1 × Lit−2 + γ4 ′Xit−1
)
, (3)
where Z is our proxy for the likelihood of the firm being overvalued. The other variables are defined
in connection with Equation (1).
In Equation (3), we are interested in how Z moderates the effect of liquidity on activism, that
is, how the marginal effect of liquidity changes in Z. This effect is given by the cross-derivative of
Φ(·) with respect to L and Z, which in our specification is:
∂
(
∂Φ(u)
∂L
)
∂Z
= γ3Φ
′ (u) + (γ1 + γ3Zit−1) (γ2 + γ3Lit−2) Φ′′ (u) . (4)
Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) provide a Stata procedure “inteff” that estimates this marginal effect
as well as the standard errors of the effect computed with the delta method (see also (Ai and Norton
2003). We report the estimated marginal interaction effect from (4) as the average value across all
the observations in the sample.
Table 6 presents results from estimating the model in Equation (3) when liquidity is measured
using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009). Focusing first on Column (1), where
overvaluation is measured by Ln(Volatility/Institutional Holding), the first row shows that the co-
efficient estimate on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. More importantly,
the second segment of the table shows that the average liquidity-overvaluation interaction effect is
negative (−0.06). The associated average z-value, −2.2, indicates statistical significance at conven-
tional levels. Thus, the marginal effect of liquidity on the probability of activism is smaller when
the firm is more likely to be overvalued. Results presented in the last three rows of column (1)
reinforce this conclusion. Here, we compare the effect on the probability of activism of a discrete
change in liquidity from the 10th to 90th percentile when the overvaluation proxy is held at the
10th percentile with the corresponding change in liquidity when the overvaluation proxy is held at
the 90th percentile. With overvaluation at the 10th decile, a discrete change in liquidity increases
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the probability of activism with 0.68 percentage points. The corresponding change in liquidity for
the most overvalued firms (the 90th decile) increases the probability of activism by 0.33 percent-
age points; that is, the effect is approximately halved. The last row of the table shows that the
difference of 0.36 percentage points is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.035.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 estimate the effect of overvaluation using Volatility and Ln(1/Institutional
Holding) as separate overvaluation proxies. The results are very similar to the results when
Ln(Volatility/Institutional Holding) is the overvaluation proxy. Column (4) of Table 6 shows how
overvaluation moderates the effect of liquidity on the likelihood of activism when overvaluation is
proxied by price pressure from mutual fund inflows. Focusing on the second segment of the table,
the average liquidity-overvaluation interaction effect is negative and statistically significant. When
investigating large changes in liquidity (last three rows of the table) we again see that the effect
of liquidity on the likelihood of activism is significantly smaller when the firm is more likely to be
overvalued.
Notice that Column (3) of Table 6 shows that the effect of liquidity on voice is smaller for firms
more likely to be short sale constrained (i.e., firms with low institutional ownership.) By itself, this
results is also consistent with Edmans’ (2009) theoretical result that greater short-sale constraints
enhances threat of exit. However, all our other proxies for overvaluation have similar effects as
the proxy for short-sale constraints. This is consistent with Kahn and Winton (1998) and Winton
and Li (2006), but not with Edmans (2009), and suggests that our results are indeed driven by a
diminished incentive for voice rather than by threat of exit.
Table 7 presents the same analysis as in Table 6, except that the effective trading cost measure
of Hasbrouck (2009) is replaced by the trade impact measure of Amihud (2002). The results are
qualitatively similar.
In sum, the evidence documented in Tables 6 and 7 is consistent with our earlier findings that
liquidity increases the probability of activism for the average firm. However, the effect of liquidity
is considerably smaller for firms that are more likely to be overvalued. These findings imply that
liquidity decreases the probability of activism in overvalued firms, consistent with the proposition
of Kahn and Winton (1998) and Winton and Li (2006).
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In the next section we attempt to uncover the mechanism through which liquidity impacts
activism by documenting the importance of activists’ pre-event trading in the target firm’s stock.
3.4 Evidence on preactivism trading in target firms
So far we have documented an economically and statistically strong positive relation between liq-
uidity and the probability of activism. This finding is consistent with the view that high liquidity
facilitates preactivism trading in target firms. When the expected profit (price appreciation) from
existing holdings and preactivism trading outweighs the expected cost of activism, shareholder ac-
tivism will occur, creating a positive relation between liquidity and the probability of activism. This
section documents that preactivism trading is common and that shareholder activists on average
purchase a significant fraction of their holdings at announcement during a short period just prior
to the announcement of activism.
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on preactivism trading. As discussed in Subsection 2.2, we
are able to extract trading data for a sample of 259 target firms. The first column in Table 8 shows
that in 143 of these firms, hedge fund activists are involved. For the majority of the remaining
116 cases, the shareholder activist is a shareholder committee, an individual investor and/or an
investment company. The second column shows that shareholder activists trade in the target firm
prior to the activism announcement in 76% of the 259 cases. The next two columns show that
there are 11,518 trades reported and that 95% of these trades are purchases. Thus, preactivism
buying of target shares occurs in two-thirds of our events, suggesting that pre-event accumulation
of stock does not occur in an ad hoc manner but is an integral part of many activists’ intervention
strategies.
The last six columns of Table 8 report descriptive statistics on trade size, the fraction of out-
standing shares acquired during the 252 day trading period prior to the activism announcement,
and a measure of the profit from preactivism trading. Focusing on the first row, the average trade
size is $346,000. The medium trade size is only $16,000, implying that the average trade size is
driven up by some very large trades. Activist shareholders acquire a significant portion of their
ownership during the 252-day period leading up to the activism announcement. The two columns
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entitled “Acquired ownership” show that activist shareholders that trade in the target firm, on
average acquire a total of 4.25% of the target firm’s outstanding shares during the 252-day pe-
riod prior to the announcement. This makes up 54% of the activist’s holdings at the time of the
announcement. Turning to the profit from trading, the average activist earns $1.56 million on
the trades made prior to activism. This profit is computed as the difference between the shares
acquired, valued at the activism announcement day price, and the actual acquisition price of the
same shares. The last column shows that the profit is 8.5% of the announcement date value of the
acquired shares. Given that most of the trades are done close to the announcement (see Figure 2),
the profit is economically large. Moving to the other rows of the table, we see that hedge funds
and investment companies acquire a larger than average fraction of the outstanding shares. They
also earn larger profits in absolute terms.
Table 9 investigates the relation between our liquidity measures and the amount of preactivism
trading. If liquidity positively affects the probability of activism because it allows activists to profit
from preactivism trading in the target firm, the amount of trading should increase in liquidity. To
test this, we regress the fraction of the target firm’s outstanding shares acquired by the activist
during the 252-day period prior to the announcement on liquidity and a set of control variables.
To ensure that the period over which we measure liquidity and control variables do not overlap
with the period over which we record trading, liquidity is measured in year t − 3 relative to the
activism year, whereas the control variables are measured in year t− 2. Measuring liquidity using
the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009), we find that liquidity has a positive impact
on the amount of trading. The effect is statistically significant with a t-value of 2.52 when using
all available data (Column (1)) and with a t-value of 2.07 when dropping observations with zero
trade and ownership below 5% (Column (2)). Measuring liquidity with Amihud’s (2002) measure
leaves us with the same conclusion.
Overall, this section shows that preactivism trading is very common in our sample of shareholder
activism events. Shareholder activists purchase a significant fraction of their holdings of target
shares in the 252-day period ending with the announcement day. The amount of trading is also
increasing in the liquidity of the target. The existence of systematic pre-event trading provides
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additional evidence in favor of the view that liquidity increases the probability of activism because
it allows a potential activist to trade on the private information that value will be improved through
his forthcoming activism.
4. Conclusion
This paper examines empirically the effect of stock liquidity on shareholders’ incentives to engage
in activism. Theory proposes that liquidity may help to overcome the costs of activism because
it allows the activist to purchase shares in the target at a price that does not reflect the (higher)
postactivism value of the firm. However, liquidity may also discourage activism. In cases in which
the shareholder has private information that the firm is overvalued, he is likely to profit more from
exit as opposed to activist voice.
Using a sample of 385 shareholder activist events collected for the 1994–2007 period, we provide
four pieces of evidence that shed new light on the relation between liquidity and shareholder voice.
Our findings support the view that liquidity increases the probability of activism because it allows
a potential activist to trade on his private information that the target firm’s value will be improved
through activism.
First, we show that that liquidity, on average, has a positive effect on the likelihood of share-
holder activism. Second, we uncover cross-sectional heterogeneity in the effect of liquidity on
activism. Theory suggests the effect will be diminished for overvalued firms and we interact liquid-
ity with proxies for overvaluation in our regressions. The results show that the effect on activism of
an increase in liquidity is significantly lower for the decile of firms most likely to be overvalued com-
pared with the decile of firms least likely to be overvalued. Third, we document that pre-activism
trading is very common in our sample of activism events. Shareholder activists purchase a signif-
icant fraction of their holdings of target shares in a short period leading up to the announcement
of activism announcement. Fourth, the extent of activists’ trading is increasing in the liquidity of
the target firms’ stocks.
We conclude that liquidity, through its effect on the value of shareholders’ private information,
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has a significant impact on shareholders’ incentives to intervene in corporate governance. As an
increasing fraction of equity trading is moving from traditional exchanges to new trading venues
and shareholder activism has become an increasingly important way of affecting the governance of
public companies, our paper highlights another reason to discuss and study whether these dramatic
changes in how equities are traded influence liquidity.
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Figure 1
Fraction of firms that experience shareholder activism, 1994–2007
This figure shows how shareholder activism varies across sample years: 1994 through the third
quarter of 2007. For each year we identify all firms that satisfy non-activism-related sampling
criteria. Each bar in the figure represents the fraction of firms experiencing shareholder activism
in a given year. A firm experiences shareholder activism if a nonmanagement shareholder or group
of shareholders file a shareholder proposal or a contested solicitation through EDGAR. The light
area of the 2007 bar is the proportionally projected number of activism cases in the fourth quarter
of 2007 (which is outside our sample).
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Figure 2
Average net fraction of target firms’ outstanding shares traded by shareholder activists
This figure shows the average net fraction of outstanding shares traded by activists on event days
−252 through +40 days relative to the announcement day. The average net fraction of outstanding
shares is negative on a given event day when shareholder activists on average have sold shares in
the target firms. Trading data are collected from the last 13D (form SC 13D on EDGAR) filed by
the activist prior to the activism announcement and all amendments to this filing filed before day
+40 relative to the announcement day (form SC 13D/A on EDGAR). Firms for which the activist
did not report any trades, but for which such reporting would not be required because ownership in
the target firm is less than 5%, are excluded from the analysis. Altogether, the sample includes 259
event firms. After trimming the sample for outliers by dropping the ten largest trades, the total
number of trades used to construct the graphical representation of trading in the figure is 11,508.
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Table 1
Activist shareholder type and purpose of shareholder activism
Average
activist
ownership
Number
of
cases
Proportion
of
events
Panel A: Type of activism
Proxy contest 10.0 331 86.0
Shareholder proposal 1.3 43 11.2
Proxy contest and shareholder proposal 4.9 3 0.8
Other 6.8 8 2.0
Total 9.0 385 100.0
Panel B: Activist shareholder identity and stock ownership
Hedge funds 9.1 182 47.3
Shareholder committees 10.9 111 28.8
Individual investors 9.1 51 13.2
Workers unions 0.0 32 8.3
Investment companies 8.9 30 7.8
Industrial owners 15.4 12 3.1
Financial institutions 5.8 8 2.1
Pension funds 2.1 8 2.1
Investment managers 5.9 8 2.1
Private equity companies 6.3 4 1.0
Unknown 8.8 2 0.5
Panel C: Stated purpose of activism
Change in the board of directors 10.0 318 82.6
Change in corporate governance, including voting procedures 8.0 164 42.6
Change in business strategy 9.5 163 42.3
Sale of target assets or sale of target company 8.7 132 34.3
Improvement in operating efficiency 9.4 100 26.0
Change in the compensation of the CEO or directors 9.3 87 22.6
Removal of takeover defense 8.1 71 18.4
Change in payout policy (dividend or stock repurchase) 7.6 63 16.4
Replacement of the CEO 11.6 60 15.6
Change in capital structure (debt-equity ratio) 8.9 30 7.8
Prevention of acquisition or merger with another company 7.6 14 3.6
Prevention of take-over 8.1 14 3.6
Suggestion of a specific means of financing 11.1 10 2.6
This table categorizes activist events in the sample according to type of activism (panel A), dissident shareholder
identity (panel B), and the stated purpose of the activism (panel C). The categories in panels B and C may overlap.
Information on activism type, dissident shareholder identity, and stock ownership are from SEC filings and Factiva
news searches. Stock ownership is recorded at the date of the SEC filing. The classification of the purpose of
activism is based on the statements made by the activist in the SEC filing. The sample period is 1994 through the
third quarter of 2007. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares and is
restricted to firms that have information on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio in the year prior to the
year of activism.
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Table 2
Characteristics of firms targeted by a shareholder activist and of firms not targeted
by an activist
Firm-years
with activism
Firm-years
without activism Difference
Variable N Mean N Mean Mean t-value
Liquidity(t−1) 383 −0.010 75,999 −0.013 −0.003 -5.8
Liquidity(t−2) 372 −0.010 69,861 −0.013 −0.003 -6.4
Abnormal performance(t−1) 381 −0.010 85,299 0.004 0.013 5.5
Abnormal performance(t−2) 365 −0.005 77,417 0.006 0.009 3.8
Herfindahl, institutional ownership(t−1) 382 0.021 88,474 0.023 0.002 1.1
Institutional holding(t−1) 379 0.422 88,224 0.374 −0.048 -3.3
Institutional breadth(t−1) 382 0.050 88,589 0.042 −0.008 -1.8
Volatility(t−1) 381 0.130 86,332 0.145 0.014 3.0
Analyst coverage(t−1) 385 4.961 91,501 4.121 −0.839 -2.4
Nasdaq 385 0.623 91,501 0.552 −0.071 -2.9
Log(Market cap)(t−1) 385 5.148 91,501 5.150 0.002 0.0
Book-to-market ratio(t−1) 385 0.998 91,501 1.771 0.773 12.4
Log(Sales)(t−1) 384 5.110 90,910 4.848 −0.262 -1.9
Dividend yield(t−1) 384 0.011 90,374 0.057 0.046 17.6
Cash(t−1) 381 0.171 89,982 0.172 0.001 0.0
R&D(t−1) 382 0.034 87,325 0.040 0.007 1.9
This table compares characteristics of firms that experience shareholder activism in a given year with the charac-
teristics of firms that do not experience shareholder activism. A firm experiences shareholder activism in year t if a
nonmanagement shareholder or group of shareholders file a shareholder proposal or a contested solicitation through
EDGAR some time during year t. Liquidity is measured using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck
(2009) multiplied by −1. Thus, higher values of the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. Abnormal
performance(t−1) is measured as the average monthly abnormal performance for year t− 1. Abnormal monthly per-
formance for month s is computed as follows: using a minimum of 12 monthly returns and a maximum of 60 monthly
returns for the period s − 60 through s − 1, we regress excess returns for stock i on the three Fama and French
(1993) factors and a momentum factor. Benchmark return is computed as the sum of regression coefficients times
corresponding factor realizations for month s. The abnormal return for month s is the difference between the return
on stock i and the benchmark return. Herfindahl, institutional ownership is the Herfindahl index of institutional
ownership and is computed as the sum of squared ownership fractions for shareholders making 13F filings with the
SEC. Institutional holding is the aggregate stockholding of shareholders making 13F filings to the SEC. Institutional
breadth is the number of institutional investors that have reported ownership through 13F filings normalized with
the total number of institutional owners reporting in a given year. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly
returns during year t. Analyst coverage is the number of earnings estimates found in I/B/E/S. Log(Market cap)
is the natural logarithm of the end-of-December market capitalization. Book-to-market ratio is the book value of
equity divided by the market value of equity. Log(Sales) is the natural logarithm of the dollar value of sales. Cash
is cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. Dividend yield is total dividend (common dividend plus
preferred dividend) divided by market value of common equity plus book value of preferred equity. Book value of
preferred equity is the first nonmissing value when using redemption value, liquidating value, and the carrying value
in that order. R&D is research and development expenses divided by total assets. If R&D expenses are missing from
Compustat, they are assumed to be zero. All variables are measured one year prior to the year of activism, except
where indicated. All variables that are ratios based on Compustat data (book-to-market ratio, Cash, dividend yield,
and R&D) are trimmed by removing the lower and higher 0.005 percentile of the distribution (i.e, removing 0.5%
of the observations in each tail), except R&D, which is trimmed only at the upper tail. The t-test of differences is
two-sided and allows for unequal variances. The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007. The sample
only includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample is also restricted to firms
that have information on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio in the year prior to the activism year.
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Table 3
Probit models of shareholder activism using Hasbrouk’s (2009) effective trading cost
measure to form liquidity variables
Model (1) (2)
Liquidity(t−1) 12.77 ( 4.81)
Liquidity(t−2) 10.27 ( 3.30)
Abnormal performance(t−1) −0.96 (−2.27) −0.62 (−1.42)
Abnormal performance(t−2) −1.38 (−3.46) −1.13 (−2.92)
Herfindahl, institutional ownership(t−1) −0.60 (−0.89) −0.57 (−0.88)
Institutional holding(t−1) 0.26 ( 2.55) 0.26 ( 2.54)
Institutional breadth(t−1) 1.67 ( 4.02) 1.49 ( 3.51)
Volatility(t−1) −0.59 (−2.02) −0.63 (−2.16)
Analyst coverage(t−1) 0.00 ( 0.81) 0.00 ( 0.72)
Nasdaq 0.06 ( 1.32) 0.06 ( 1.20)
Log(Market cap)(t−1) −0.14 (−5.45) −0.13 (−4.83)
Book-to-market ratio(t−1) 0.01 ( 0.82) 0.00 ( 0.40)
Log(Sales)(t−1) 0.01 ( 0.59) 0.01 ( 0.62)
Dividend yield(t−1) −0.58 (−0.88) −0.57 (−0.90)
Cash(t−1) 0.27 ( 2.14) 0.27 ( 2.15)
R&D(t−1) −0.67 (−2.37) −0.66 (−2.36)
Year dummies yes yes
Number of observations 63,555 63,396
Number of activism events 355 354
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.027
Change in probability of activism when liquidity is increased
from the 10th to the 90th percentile (p-value)
0.47 ( 0.000) 0.40 ( 0.000)
Change relative to sample probability of activism 84.9% 71.2%
This table documents the effects of independent variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism.
The dependent variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and is zero otherwise. Liquidity
is measured using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009) multiplied by −1. Thus, higher values of
the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. In model (1) liquidity is measured one year prior to the year of
activism (Liquidity(t−1)). In model (2) liquidity is measured two years prior to the year of activism (Liquidity(t−2)).
The other explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. When computing change in probability for a given change in
liquidity, other explanatory variables are held at their means. Parentheses in the first segment of the table contain
z-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator. Parentheses in the second
segment of the table contain p-values from a Wald-test of the significance of the change in probability when liquidity
is increased from the 10th to the 90th percentile. The corresponding change in percent relative to the unconditional
probability of activism in the regression sample is given in the bottom line of the table. The sample includes firms
listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of
2007.
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Table 4
Probit models of shareholder activism using alternative liquidity variables based on
Hasbrouk’s (2009) effective trading cost measure
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity(t−4,t−3) 5.9 (2.3)
IV liquidity(t−2) 19.2 (2.5)
Orthogonalized liquidity(t−2) 8.1 (3.2)
Liquidity dummy(t−2) 0.2 (3.4)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 60,892 62,025 63,109 63,396
Number of activism events 347 349 353 354
Change in probability when liquidity
is increased from the 10th to the 90th
percentile (p-value)
0.25
(0.018)
0.79
(0.043)
0.28
(0.002)
0.28
(0.000)
Change relative to sample probability of activism 44.2% 142.3% 49.6% 50.1%
This table documents the effects of independent variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism.
The dependent variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and is zero otherwise. Liquidity
is measured using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009) multiplied by −1. Thus, higher values of
the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. In model (1) liquidity is measured over years t − 4 and t − 3
relative to the year of activism. Model (2) is an iv-probit model where liquidity in year t− 2 is instrumented using:
(1) the average liquidity of firms in industries outside of firm i’s industry, measured two years prior to the year of
activism and (2) a decimal dummy that equals one for the years following 2001 multiplied by the average sales of the
firm for the period 1994–2001. In model (3) liquidity is measured using the residual from the following regression:
Lt−2 = γ0 + γ1Herft−2 + γ2InstHt−2 + γ3InstBt−2 + γ4AvgLt−2 + t−2 ,
where Lt−2 is Hasbrouk’s (2009) measure multiplied by −1, Herf is the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership,
InstH is Institutional holdings, InstB is Institutional breadth, and AvgLt is the average Hasbrouck (2009) illiquidity
in the cross-section of firms in year t. In model (4) liquidity is measured as a dummy variable that equals one in
year t if the Hasbrouck (2009) effective cost is greater than the cross-sectional median in year t. In all models,
the control variables are the same as in Table 3. When computing the change in probability for a given change in
liquidity, other variables enter with the values they have in our sample. Parentheses in the first segment of the table
contain z-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator. For model (3) the
standard errors are bootstrapped. Parentheses in the second segment of the table contain p-values from a Wald-test
of the significance of the change in probability when liquidity is increased from the 10th to the 90th percentile. The
corresponding change in percent relative to the unconditional probability of activism in the regression sample is given
in the bottom line of the table. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares.
The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007.
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Table 5
Probit models of shareholder activism using Amihud’s (2002) trade impact measure
to form liquidity variables
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Amihud liquidity(t−1) 0.9 (2.2)
Amihud liquidity(t−2) 1.2 (2.4)
Amihud liquidity(t−4,t−3) 0.7 (1.7)
IV Amihud liquidity(t−2) 4.6 (4.9)
Control variables yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 60,690 60,279 55,351 57,689
Number of activism events 345 346 326 346
Change in probability when liquidity
is increased from the 10th to the 90th
percentile (p-value)
0.13 (0.023) 0.15 (0.012) 0.10 (0.079) 1.36 (0.084)
Change relative to sample probability of activism 22.1% 26.4% 17.3% 237.2%
This table documents the effects of independent variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism.
The dependent variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and is zero otherwise. Liquidity
is measured using the trade impact measure of Amihud (2002) multiplied by −1. Thus, higher values of the liquidity
variable correspond to higher liquidity. The liquidity measure is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. In model
(1) liquidity is measured one year prior to the year of activism (Liquidity(t−1)). In model (2) liquidity is measured
two years prior to the year of activism (Liquidity(t−2)). In model (3) liquidity is measured over years t− 4 and t− 3
relative to the year of activism. Model (4) is an iv-probit model, where liquidity in year t− 2 is instrumented using:
(1) the average liquidity of firms in industries outside of firm i’s industry, measured two years prior to the year of
activism and (2) a decimal dummy that equals one for the years following 2001 multiplied by the average sales of
the firm for the period 1994–2001. In all models, the control variables are the same as in Table 3. When computing
the change in probability for a given change in liquidity, other variables are held at their means. Parentheses in the
first segment of the table contain z-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich
estimator. Parentheses in the second segment of the table contain p-values from a Wald-test of the significance of
the change in probability when liquidity is increased from the 10th to the 90th percentile. The corresponding change
in percent relative to the unconditional probability of activism in the regression sample is given in the bottom line of
the table. The sample only includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample
period is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007.
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Table 6
The impact of overvaluation on the effect of liquidity on shareholder activism, mea-
suring liquidity using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009)
Overvaluation proxy
Ln
(
Volatilityt−1
Inst Holdt−1
)
Volatility(t−1) Ln
(
1
Inst Holdt−1
)
Price
Pressureit−1
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity(t−2) × overval. proxy(t−1) −1.86 (−3.6) −15.73 (−2.7) −2.18 (−3.9) −1.57 (−3.8)
Liquidity(t−2) 11.82 ( 3.9) 13.33 ( 4.0) 16.25 ( 4.2) 11.21 ( 3.5)
Overvaluation proxy(t−1) −0.08 (−2.7) −0.88 (−2.6) −0.09 (−3.6) −0.07 (−2.9)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 63,396 63,396 63,396 63,396
Number of activism events 354 354 354 354
Average Liquidity-Overvaluation
interaction effect (average z-value) −0.06 (−2.2) −0.57 (−2.2) −0.07 (−2.5) −0.45 (−2.3)
Overvaluation at percentile 10. Liquidity
changed from 10th to 90th percentile 0.68 (0.001) 0.64 (0.000) 0.94 (0.001) 0.51 (0.000)
Overvaluation at percentile 90. Liquidity
changed from 10th to 90th percentile 0.33 (0.001) 0.41 (0.000) 0.49 (0.000) 0.31 (0.000)
Difference in probability change 0.36 (0.035) 0.23 (0.030) 0.45 (0.013) 0.20 (0.020)
This table documents the effects of independent variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism
using a probit regression. The dependent variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t
and is zero otherwise. Liquidity is measured using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009) multiplied
by −1. Thus, higher values of the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. In Columns (1) through (3),
overvaluation proxies are constructed using the variables Volatilityt−1 and Institutional Holdingt−1. Volatilityt−1 is
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for year t− 1 relative to the activism year. Institutional holdingt−1
is the aggregate stockholding of shareholders making 13F filings to the SEC at the end of year t − 1 relative to the
activism year. In Column (4), the overvaluation proxy is mutual fund inflow induced price pressure, computed under
the assumption that all mutual funds that experience inflow exceeding 5% of their total assets purchase additional
stocks in proportion to their existing holdings. All regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table 3,
except that Volatility(t−1) is not a control variable in (2) and Institutional holding(t−1) is not a control variable in
(3). Computation of the average interaction effect and the associated z-value follows Ai and Norton (2003). When
fixing overvaluation at a given percentile and computing the change in probability for a given change in liquidity,
variables other than overvaluation and liquidity enter with their sample values. Parentheses in the first segment of
the table contain z-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator. In the
second segment of the table, parentheses in the first row contain average z-values and parentheses in the last three
rows contains p-values from a Wald test of statistical significance. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007.
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Table 7
The impact of overvaluation on the effect of liquidity on shareholder activism, mea-
suring liquidity using the effective trading cost measure of Amihud (2002)
Overvaluation proxy
Ln
(
Volatilityt−1
Inst Holdt−1
)
Volatility(t−1) Ln
(
1
Inst Holdt−1
)
Price
Pressureit−1
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity(t−2) × overval. proxy(t−1) −0.22 (−3.0) −1.83 (−4.1) −0.22 (−2.7) −0.49 (−2.0)
Liquidity(t−2) 1.60 ( 2.8) 1.64 ( 2.9) 1.93 ( 2.8) 1.20 ( 2.4)
Overvaluation proxy(t−1) −0.05 (−1.7) −0.93 (−2.9) −0.05 (−2.2) −0.07 (−3.2)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 60,279 60,279 60,279 60,279
Number of activism events 346 346 346 346
Average liquidity-overvaluation
interaction effect (average z-value) −0.01 (−1.8) −0.08 (−2.1) −0.01 (−1.9) −0.01 (−1.9)
Overvaluation at percentile 10. Liquidity
changed from 10th to 90th percentile 0.27 (0.011) 0.27 (0.005) 0.32 (0.012) 0.19 (0.012)
Overvaluation at percentile 90. Liquidity
changed from 10th to 90th percentile 0.17 (0.010) 0.17 (0.003) 0.22 (0.011) 0.11 (0.015)
Difference in probability change 0.10 (0.146) 0.10 (0.048) 0.10 (0.095) 0.08 (0.043)
This table documents the effects of independent variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism
using a probit regression. The dependent variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and
is zero otherwise. Liquidity is measured using the trade impact measure of Amihud (2002) multiplied by −1. Thus,
higher values of the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. The liquidity measure is winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentile. In Columns (1) through (3), overvaluation proxies are constructed using the variables Volatilityt−1
and Institutional Holdingt−1. Volatilityt−1 is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for year t− 1 relative
to the activism year. Institutional holdingt−1 is the aggregate stockholding of shareholders making 13F filings to
the SEC at the end of year t − 1 relative to the activism year. In Column (4), the overvaluation proxy is mutual
fund inflow-induced price pressure, computed under the assumption that all mutual funds that experience inflow
exceeding 5% of their total assets purchase additional stocks in proportion to their existing holdings. All regressions
include the same set of control variables as in Table 3, except that Volatility(t−1) is not a control variable in (2)
and Institutional holding(t−1) is not a control variable in (3). Computation of the average interaction effect and the
associated z-value follows Ai and Norton (2003). When fixing overvaluation at a given percentile and computing the
change in probability for a given change in liquidity, variables other than overvaluation and liquidity enter with their
sample values. Parentheses in the first segment of the table contain z-values from robust standard errors estimated
with the Huber-White sandwich estimator. In the second segment of the table, parentheses in the first row contain
average z-values and parentheses in the last three rows contains p-values from a Wald test of statistical significance.
The sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period is 1994
through the third quarter of 2007.
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Table 8
Trading in target firms by shareholder activists prior to the activism announcement
Descriptive statistics using the sample of trades
Sample Trades Trade size
Acquired
Ownership Profit
Target
firms
Percent
w/trade N
Percent
buys
Mean
$1000s
Median
$1000s
Perc-
entage
points
Percent
of own
block
Mean
$1000s Percent
All 259 76% 11,518 95% 346 16 4.25 54% 1,563 8.5%
Hedge
funds 143 88 7,753 93 457 39 4.89 61 2,117 9.9
Shareholder
committees 85 74 3,445 90 108 19 3.09 37 413 6.1
Investment
companies 22 77 456 97 587 31 4.71 39 2,103 11.8
This table reports descriptive statistics on trading by shareholder activists over the one-year period ending with the
activism announcement. Trading data are collected from the last 13D (form SC 13D on EDGAR) filed by the activist
prior to the activism announcement and all amendments to this filing filed before the day of activism announcement
(form SC 13D/A on EDGAR). Firms for which the activist did not report any trades, but for which such reporting
would not be required because ownership in the target firm is less than 5%, are excluded from the analysis. The
Hedge fund, Shareholder committees, and Investment companies are not mutually exclusive categories (i.e., a trade
can occur in more than one category.) The first column (“Target firms”) reports the number of firms for which we
can observe activist trades. The second column (“Percent w/trade”) reports the percentage of firms for which the
activist traded prior to the activism announcement. Column three (“N”) reports the number of trades. Column
four (“Percent buys”) reports the percentage of trades for which the activist bought shares. Column five (“Mean
$1000s”) reports the mean size of the activist trade in $1000s. Column six (“Median $1000s”) reports the median
size of the activist trade in $1000s. Column seven (“Percentage points”) reports the ownership, in percentage points,
the activist acquired over the 252 trading dates prior to the announcement. Column eight (“Percent of own block”)
reports the ownership the activist acquired over the 252 trading days prior to the announcement, in percent of his
ownership in the target at announcement. Column nine (“Mean $1000s”) reports the dollar difference, in $1000s,
between the announcement day value of the stocks acquired over the last 252 trading days and the amount spent
to acquire those stocks. The last column (“Percent”) reports the dollar profit in percent of the value of the stocks
acquired by the activist over the last 252 trading days, valued on the announcement date. The sample includes firms
listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of
2007.
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Table 9
Liquidity and preactivism trading by shareholder activists
Hasbrouck Amihud
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity(t−3) 40.98 ( 2.52) 40.97 ( 2.07) 3.75 ( 2.38) 3.93 ( 1.94)
Abnormal performance(t−2) 2.10 ( 0.32) 4.64 ( 0.66) 1.36 ( 0.20) 3.68 ( 0.52)
Abnormal performance(t−3) −9.48 (−1.40) −9.64 (−1.51) −10.21 (−1.51) −10.20 (−1.63)
Herfindahl, institutional ownership(t−2) −4.89 (−0.63) −12.92 (−1.10) −5.93 (−0.95) −15.34 (−1.56)
Institutional holding(t−2) 4.05 ( 2.96) 6.16 ( 3.28) 4.18 ( 3.01) 6.43 ( 3.39)
Institutional breadth(t−2) 0.00 ( 1.20) 0.14 ( 1.89) 0.00 ( 1.22) 0.16 ( 2.21)
Volatility(t−2) −3.50 (−1.16) −3.51 (−1.01) −5.42 (−1.75) −5.54 (−1.57)
Analyst coverage(t−2) 0.07 ( 1.40) 0.11 ( 1.24) 0.08 ( 1.48) 0.11 ( 1.28)
Nasdaq −0.08 (−0.17) 0.02 ( 0.03) −0.22 (−0.44) −0.11 (−0.17)
Log(Market cap)(t−2) −1.20 (−4.29) −1.43 (−3.38) −1.20 (−4.33) −1.45 (−3.37)
Book-to-market ratio(t−2) −0.11 (−0.19) 0.15 ( 0.19) −0.04 (−0.06) 0.27 ( 0.36)
Log(Sales)(t−2) 0.14 ( 1.29) 0.21 ( 1.53) 0.13 ( 1.17) 0.19 ( 1.32)
Dividend yield(t−2) 2.86 ( 0.20) 74.95 ( 1.55) 3.12 ( 0.21) 75.51 ( 1.51)
Cash(t−2) −0.67 (−0.35) 0.81 ( 0.37) −0.25 (−0.13) 1.32 ( 0.60)
R&D(t−2) 7.54 ( 2.38) 7.32 ( 1.90) 7.83 ( 2.53) 7.62 ( 2.03)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 311 232 298 221
R2 0.175 0.197 0.186 0.208
This table reports results from a regression of preactivism trading on liquidity and a set of control variables. The
dependent variable is the fraction of the target firm’s shares acquired by the shareholder activist over the year ending
on the day prior to the activism announcement. Liquidity is measured using the effective trading cost measure of
Hasbrouck (2009) and the trade impact measure of Amihud (2002), both multiplied with −1. Thus, higher values of
the liquidity variables correspond to higher liquidity. Amihud liquidity is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Liquidity is measured, in event time, during the year prior to the year over which trading is recorded. Control
variables are defined in Table 2. Trading data are collected from the last 13D (form SC 13D on EDGAR) filed by
the activist prior to the activism announcement and all amendments to this filing filed before the announcement
date (filed on form SC 13D/A on EDGAR). In models (1) and (3), cases for which the activist did not report any
trades assumes trading is zero. In models (2) and (4), cases for which the activist did not report any trades, but for
which such reporting would not be required because ownership in the target firm is less than 5%, are excluded from
the analysis. Parentheses contain t-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich
estimator. The sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period
is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007.
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Appendix A. Shareholder Activist Types
Shareholder activist types in Table 1 are classified according to the definitions that follow. In gen-
eral, the categories are overlapping such that if different dissenting shareholder types file jointly,
we register both types.
Hedge funds: Private investment partnership, a private investment fund, or a hedge fund manager
or sponsor.
Financial institutions: Broker-dealers, commercial, savings banks, etc.
Private equity companies: Private equity investors and funds.
Investment managers: Managers of private clients’ assets portfolios, including financial advisors
and consultants.
Investment companies: Closed-end funds and open-end mutual funds.
Pensions funds: Retirement systems such as CalPERS.
Industrial owners: Nonfinancial corporations; typically such firms own an equity stake in the target
firm.
Individual investors: Filer is a single individual, most often a shareholder of the target company.
Shareholder committee: More than one individual registrant is specified in the filing, which often
occurs under a name of the form “TargetCompany Shareholder Committee.” Shareholder commit-
tees typically consist of several individual shareholders and may include company directors, and it
is not unusual to observe a committee cooperating with hedge funds, investment companies and
managers, or workers unions.
Workers unions: Union filers.
Unknown: Categories for which we are unable to identify the type of filer.
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Appendix B. Instrumental Variable Probit
We use two instruments for stock liquidity. The first exploits the introduction of decimalization on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in 2001. Evidence presented by Bessembinder (2003) and Furfine
(2003) suggests that decimalization had a significant positive effect on liquidity. The event also has
been employed as an instrument for liquidity by Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009), Bharath, Jayaraman,
and Nagar (2013), and Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013). The introduction of decimalization consti-
tutes an exogenous shock to liquidity that is uncorrelated with shareholder activism as required for
an instrument.
A dummy variable for the event of decimalization may be an instrument for stock liquidity in
its own right. However, decimalization affects all stocks the same way and only picks up variation
over time. Instead, we create an instrument with cross-sectional variation by interacting a dummy
variable for decimalization that equals one from 2001 and onwards (and otherwise zero) with a
variable that varies across individual stocks. Furfine (2003) and Chakravarty, Wood, and van Hess
(2004) document that the impact of decimalization was larger for stocks traded more actively and
for stocks with relatively wider quoted spreads.
Data on the average time between trades used by Furfine (2003) are not available to us, but we
exploit the fact that larger firms are generally traded more actively. We construct an instrument
by interacting a dummy for decimalization by the average firm size over the years prior to decimal-
ization. We prefer to measure firm size by Ln(sales) because sales are unaffected by movements in
stock prices as opposed to, say, market capitalization. The interacted variable equals zero prior to
decimalization and attains a constant value in the years afterwards, such that the constant magni-
tude is larger for larger firms. The interacted variable thus captures a change in the cross-sectional
distribution in the year 2001, and there is little reason to believe that the magnitude of this “shift”
is correlated with activism. For that to be the case, the cross-sectional pattern of the shift would
have to be correlated with a similar cross-sectional shift in activism in 2001.
The second instrument is created from the average liquidity of stocks in industries other than
the industry of the stock in question. We use average liquidity of firms in other industries in year
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t− 2 as an instrument for the liquidity of stock i in year t− 2. Industry membership is determined
using SIC codes and the Fama and French 49 industry definition.
The correlation between the Hasbrouck-liquidity measure and the average liquidity of stocks in
other industries is 0.26. For the decimalization×average sales instrument, the correlation is 0.27.
Correlations with Amihud’s (2002) measure of liquidity are 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.
The coefficients are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood, but we present the results
from a “first-stage” regression in which the endogenous variable, liquidity, is regressed on the
instruments and all other exogenous variables in Table Appendix B.1. The instruments are all
strongly significant as required. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of overidentifying restrictions shows
that we cannot reject the null that our set of instruments for liquidity is valid. Using the Hasbrouck
(2009) measure of liquidity, we cannot reject the null that liquidity is exogenous (p-value of 0.214).
However, using Amihud’s (2002) measure, this null is rejected (p-value of 0.04).
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Table Appendix B.1
First-stage regressions for instrumental variable probit models of shareholder activism
Model Hasbrouck (2009) Amihud (2002)
Average liquidity in other industries than stock i’s(t−2) −7.50 (−18.90) −6.17 (−12.56)
Decimalization dummy × avg. Log(Sales) prior to 2001 −0.17 (−35.54) −0.71 (−15.64)
Abnormal performance(t−1) −0.04 (−29.69) −0.45 (−24.19)
Abnormal performance(t−2) −0.01 (−9.22) −0.22 (−13.00)
Herfindahl index of ownership(t−1) −0.02 (−11.40) −0.10 (−9.53)
Institutional holding(t−1) 0.01 ( 32.79) 0.04 ( 22.18)
Institutional breadth(t−1) −0.06 (−53.65) −0.48 (−43.51)
Volatility(t−1) −0.01 (−8.17) −0.09 (−5.44)
Analyst coverage(t−1) −0.00 (−17.98) −0.00 (−24.40)
Nasdaq −0.00 (−41.95) 0.01 ( 7.18)
Log(Market cap)(t−1) 0.00 ( 59.05) 0.04 ( 42.00)
Book-to-market ratio(t−1) 0.00 ( 5.21) 0.00 ( 2.87)
Log(Sales)(t−1) 0.00 ( 12.21) 0.01 ( 7.44)
Dividend yield(t−1) 0.00 ( 3.72) 0.02 ( 4.96)
Cash(t−1) 0.00 ( 8.06) 0.03 ( 7.51)
R&D(t−1) 0.01 ( 9.56) 0.09 ( 11.09)
Year dummies yes yes
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.214 0.040
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 0.430 0.841
Number of observations 60,728 58,957
Number of activism events 354 346
This table documents the first-stage regression results from an instrumental variable probit model of independent
variables on the probability of experiencing shareholder activism when stock liquidity is instrumented. The dependent
variable equals one if firm i experiences shareholder activism in year t and is zero otherwise. Liquidity is measured
using the effective trading cost measure of Hasbrouck (2009) or Amihud’s (2002) trade impact measure, both mul-
tiplied by −1 so that higher values of the liquidity variable correspond to higher liquidity. The instruments are the
following: the average liquidity of firms in industries outside of firm i’s industry, measured two years prior to the year
of activism and a decimal dummy that equals one for the years following 2001 multiplied by the average sales of the
firm in the period 1994–2001 (divided by 100 for scaling). The other explanatory variables are defined in Table 2.
Parentheses contain z-values from robust standard errors estimated with the Huber-White sandwich estimator. The
null hypothesis for the Wald test of exogeneity is that liquidity is exogenous. The null hypothesis for the Amemiya-
Lee-Newey test of overidentifying restrictions is that the instruments are valid. The sample includes firms listed on
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with common shares. The sample period is 1994 through the third quarter of 2007.
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